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The Political Economy of a Changing Population
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ABSTRACT
In the context of an overlapping generations model with intragenerational inequality and majority
voting, I study how the taxation of the old and retired generation is affected when the population
growth rate changes. A fall in the birth rate leads to two opposite effects. On the one hand, the old
generation acquires more political power because their relative size in the voting population
increases. This exerts downward pressure on the taxation of the old. On the other hand, the tax
burden on the young (used to repay the public debt held by the old) increases, so that their support
for a low tax rate on assets held by the old decreases. In general, the number of equilibria is either
zero or two, one of which involves zero taxation while the other involves partial taxation of the
assets held by the old.
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1. Introduction
Birth rates have fallen dramatically in Western countries over the past few decades. Coupled with
the fact that life expectancy is increasing, the prediction is that the share of retired people in
Western populations will substantially grow in the future. Therefore, in this paper, I extend the real
debt repudiation model of Calvo (1988, Section I) to an overlapping generations model with
intergenerational inequality in order to investigate the politico-economic consequences of a fall in
the birth rate. On the one hand, the political power of the old and retired generation increases
because their relative number increases, which leads to pressure for a lower tax rate on their asset
holdings. On the other hand, a larger share of old people in the population also raises the tax
burden on the young, who prefer a shift towards more taxation of the old. In general, the net effect
on the taxation of the old is ambiguous and depends on the distribution of debt holdings.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 extends Calvo’s (1988, Section I)
model of real debt repudiation to an overlapping generations context with intragenerational
inequality. Section 3 derives, for a given pre-tax rate of return on debt, the voting outcome (by
majority rule) for the tax rate on public debt held by the old. In particular, I analyse how the tax
rate is affected by a fall in the population growth rate. In Section 4, I close the model and study
the existence and characteristic features of politico-economic equilibria. In general, either no or two
equilibria exist, one of which involves zero and the other partial taxation of debt held by the old.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The model
A convenient framework for analysing the politico-economic consequences of a fall in the birth
rate is obtained through the extensions of Calvo’s (1988, Section I) model of real debt repudiation
to an overlapping generations context with intragenerational inequality and voting by majority rule.
I assume that the economy has an infinite horizon, so that individuals born at different points in
time face the same optimisation problem.
The society is assumed to consist of families which are connected over time through altruism. In
each period a new generation of young agents is born which lives for two periods. Therefore, in
any period t, two generations are alive, a young and an old. An old agent gives birth toη>1 young
agents. The size of the old generation in period t is normalised to unity, so that the size of the
young generation in period t isη. Hence, the population growth rate isη-1>0.
2
Agents are risk-neutral and only consume when they are old.2 Consider some family
denoted by " ˜ ". The utility of the parent and his children are given by, respectively,
Ũt-1,t = c̃t-1,t , (2.1)
Ũt,t = ξc̃t-1,t + βc̃t,t+1e, (2.2)
where Ũt-1,t and c̃t-1,t are the period t utility and consumption, respectively, of an agent born in
period t-1 andβ is the subjective discount rate. Expectations are denoted by superscript "e ". The
old care about their own consumption only, while the young are assumed to be altruistic towards
the old.3 The parameterξ measures the degree of altruism. A young person becomes less selfish
asξ increases.
When born, a descendant of family " ˜ " receives a positive income ˜y. The income differs
across members of different families, but is the same for descendants of the same family.4 Out of
this income, the newly-born pays an amount of taxes, xt, which will be used to repay the public
debt held by the old. Only distortionary taxation is available. As in Calvo (1988), the "deadweight"
cost of taxation is captured by the loss function z(x), which is twice continuously differentiable
with z(0)=0, z′(0)=0 and z″(.)>0. After-tax income, y-xt-z(xt), can either be invested in physical
capital with an exogenous gross real rate of return R,5 or in newly issued public debt. Each period
a new issue of public debt is used to finance a public investment (e.g., infrastructure) of per new
young capita size bA, which is assumed to be exogenous (cf. Calvo, 1988). Therefore, I assume, for
convenience, that it does not enter the utility function of agents.
Denote the gross real rate of return on debt by Rbt. For a risk-neutral agent to be indifferent
between investing in physical capital and in public debt, the expected after-tax return on public
debt should be equal to the return on physical capital:
2 The assumption that consumption only takes place in the second period of an agent’s life is only made
to simplify the algebra. Given that utility derived from second-period consumption is linear, none of the
results are affected by abstracting from consumption in the first period.
3 The main results all go through if the old also care about the consumption of the young. What is
crucial (both here and in the literature on social security) is that the young care about the old. Otherwise, no
majority voting equilibrium could exist in which the debt holdings of the old are not completely taxed away.
4 The income earned by a young person can be thought of as income generated through the exploitation
of a family property.
5 This is the same as assuming the existence of a linear storage technology or the possibility of investing
abroad against a fixed gross rate of return R. The key assumption is that there is an "outside" investment
opportunity which is untaxed.
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(1-θt+1e) Rbt = R, 0≤θt+1e≤1, (2.3)
where θt+1e is the tax rate (or "repudiation rate" in Calvo’s, 1988, words) expected for the next
period on public debt issued in period t. Once debt has been issued, its gross rate of return is fixed,
but not its net rate of return. The investor recognises this and demands an interest rate Rbt which
compensates him for the expected ex post incentives to tax debt. For future convenience, I assume
that βR=1.
The per young capita tax payment follows from the government budget constraint,
xt = [(1-θt)Rb,t-1bA + αθtRb,t-1bA]/η, 0≤θt≤1, (2.4)
where Rb,t-1 is the gross real rate of return on public debt held by the old (determined in the
previous period), bA is the average amount of public debt held by the old,θt is the tax rate on debt
repayment to the old andα (0≤α<1) are the distortionary losses per unit of repayment reduction.6
Becauseα<1, a higher value ofθt lowers the per capita taxes paid by the young. Note that each
young person only pays taxes for a number of 1/η<1 old individuals.
Given that agents are indifferent between the two investment opportunities (eq.(2.4)), I
follow Calvo (1988) in assuming that they all invest an equal amount in physical capital, such that
the market for public debt exactly clears. Hence, apart from a shift by some amount k, the income
distribution is preserved in the distribution of debt holdings, which I denote by G(.). The
distribution of debt holdings is continuous and its density function is assumed to be positive only
on a connected interval on+. Hence, for every agent debt holdings are positive, with a uniquely
defined median. The (expected) consumption of an old, respectively young, person with debt
holdingsb̃, becomes:7
c̃t-1,t = (1-θt)Rb,t-1b̃ + (k-xt-1-z(xt-1))R, (2.5)
c̃t,t+1
e = (1-θt+1e)Rbtb̃ + (k-xt-z(xt))R. (2.6)
6 α can be thought of as transaction costs associated with debt repudiation (cf. Calvo, 1988).
7 I abstract from the possibility of leaving bequests or gifts, as in Tabellini (1991). Altruism manifests
itself only in the voting behaviour of agents. In fact, as long as agents care more about their own
consumption than about the consumption of their family members, they would choose not to leave any
bequests nor to make any gifts, because the marginal utility from their own consumption is higher than the
marginal utility of the consumption of their family members.
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The last terms in (2.5) and (2.6) are the physical capital investments multiplied by R.8
3. Voting on the taxation of the old
In each period, the tax policy, the combination of x andθ, is decided upon by majority rule.9 To
find the voting outcome in period t, we need to combine the two generations currently alive into
one voting population. Because xt-1 is given, the utility of the old is monotonically decreasing in
θt. To find the optimal tax ratẽθt preferred by a young agent with debt holdingsb̃, combine (2.2)
and (2.4)-(2.6), to obtain utility as a function ofθt:
Ũt,t = ξ[(1-θt)Rb,t-1b̃ + (k-xt-1-z(xt-1))R] +
β{(1-θt+1e)Rbtb̃ + [k- ((1-θt)Rb,t-1bA + αθtRb,t-1bA)/η - z(((1-θt)Rb,t-1bA + αθtRb,t-1bA)/η)]R}. (3.1)
Differentiate (3.1) with respect toθt and define (remember thatβR=1),
bLt ≡ (1/ξη)(1-α)bA [1+z′(αRb,t-1bA/η)], (3.2)
bUt ≡ (1/ξη)(1-α)bA [1+z′(Rb,t-1bA/η)], (3.3)
If b̃≤bLt, the utility of the young increases monotonically for 0≤θt≤1. Hence, a poor young person
(i.e., also a young person with a poor parent) prefers complete taxation of the debt held by the old.
The resulting reduction in his own tax payments outweighs the fall in his parent’s consumption. In
contrast, ifb̃≥bUt, indirect utility decreases for 0≤θt≤1. A sufficiently rich young person thus prefer
zero taxation of the old. Finally, if bLt<b̃<bUt, indirect utility increases on the interval [0,θ̃t),
decreases on the interval (θ̃t,1], and reaches a maximum atθt=θ̃t, which is defined by the first-
order optimisation condition,
b̃ = (1/ξη)(1-α)bA {1+z′[((1-θ̃t)Rb,t-1bA+αθ̃tRb,t-1bA)/η]}. (3.4)
If b̃ increases, the preferred tax rateθ̃t falls. The increase in the parent’s consumption, as a result
of the fall in θ̃t, more than outweighs the fall in future consumption by the young as a result of the
higher income tax xt to be paid.
8 I assume that k is large enough for consumption to be positive under any admissible policy outcome.
9 Note that the current voting outcome doesnot depend on previous voting outcomes, as we will see
below. Hence, there are no intertemporal linkages in voting behaviour.
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To determine the chosen tax policy, one needs to combine the young and the old
generation into one voting population. As shown above, preferences are single-peaked inθt.
Hence, the tax policy chosen by majority rule is the median of the distribution of most preferred
policies by the total voting population (also, see Tabellini, 1991). One can distinguish three cases:
(i) A majority of all voters is in favour of zero debt taxation. This is the case if 1 1 +η (1-
G(bUt))≥(1+η)/2. The first term on the left hand side is the total number of old multiplied by the
share (unity) of the old generation in favour of zero debt taxation. Similarly, the second term is the
total number of young in favour of zero debt taxation. The condition reduces to,
G(bUt)≤(1+η)/2η. (3.5)
(ii) A majority of all voters is in favour of complete debt taxation. This is the case if
G(bLt)≥(1+η)/2η. Because none of the old favours complete debt taxation, the number of young in
favour of θt=1 must be at least half of the total voting population.
(iii) The median of preferred tax rates,θctM, lies between zero and one. In fact, this is tax rate
preferred by a young person with debt holdings of,
bct
M = (1/ξη)(1-α)bA {1+z′[((1-θctM)Rb,t-1bA+αθctMRb,t-1bA)/η]}. (3.6)
Note that bLt<bct
M<bUt. The medianθctM is defined by the requirement that at most half of the
population prefer a lower tax rateθt (all the of old and all of the young richer than bctM) and that




M) = (1+η)/2η. (3.7)
Both a higher level of public debt, bA, and a higher interest rate Rb,t-1 raise the tax burden on the
young, who prefer a shift towards increased taxation of the old. Both bLt and bUt fall, making θt=1
more likely and θt=0 less likely. Starting from a situation of partial taxation of the old, the
outcome forθt rises if bA or Rb,t-1 increases. An increase inξ makes the young more altruistic
towards the parents and lowersθt. Similarly, an increase in the marginal costα leads to a decrease
in the taxation of the old. Finally, a fall in the birth rate,η (maintaining η>1), results intwo
oppositeeffects. On the one hand, it raises the political power of the old through their weight in
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the voting population. This effect manifests itself on the right hand side of (3.7), which increases if
η falls, and would require a lower tax rateθctM, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, a fall inη also
raises the tax burden on the young, who prefer a shift towards increased taxation of the old. This
effect appears on the left hand side of (3.7). The net effect of a fall in the birth rate is ambiguous
and depends on G(.).10
4. Equilibrium
So far, I have been concerned with the chosen tax policy when the interest rate is given on debt
due for repayment. In this section, I study the existence and some characteristic features of the
equilibria of the model. These are found if we impose the arbitrage condition (2.3) and the
requirement that expectations be rational (i.e.,θte=θt).
Corresponding to the voting outcomes, we have three candidate equilibria in each period t. The
candidate equilibrium with complete taxation of the old (θt=1) can be excluded immediately. If
agents expect their investments to be taxed away completely, they will not be prepared to invest in
the first place. The second candidate is an equilibrium withθt=0. Use (2.3), lagged by one period,
and use the rationality of expectations. Hence, substitute (3.3) into (3.5) and impose Rb,t-1=R/(1-
0)=R. An equilibrium with zero taxation of the old exists if and only if,
G{(1/ξη)(1-α)bA[1+z′(RbA/η)]} ≤ (1+η)/2η, (4.1)
Finally, there is a possibility for an equilibrium with partial taxation of the old. Combine the
equilibrium condition Rb,t-1=R/(1-θctM) with (3.6) and (3.7). Hence, an equilibrium with partial
taxation exists if and only if there exists aθt=θctM such that,
G{ (1/ξη)(1-α)bA{1+z′[RbA(1+αθctM/(1-θctM))/η]} } = (1+ η)/2η, 0<θctM<1. (4.2)
The left hand side of (4.2) is increasing inθctM for 0≤θctM<1 and is equal to the left hand side of
(4.1) if θctM=0. The following proposition is immediate:
10 If only the young had voting power, the effect of a decrease inη would be unambiguous. Starting
from a situation of partial taxation of the old, a fall inη leads to an unambiguous increase inθ.
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Proposition 1: Existence and number of equilibria. Let α>0:
(a) If (4.1) fails to hold, no politico-economic equilibrium exists.
(b) If (4.1) holds with equality, a unique equilibrium with zero debt taxation exists.
(c) If (4.1) holds with inequality, two equilibria exist, one with zero and the other with partial
debt taxation.
Proposition 1 preserves the key properties of Calvo’s (1988, Section I) model as summarised in his
Proposition I, which says that, in general, his model has either zero or two equilibria. Existence of
a unique equilibrium is a special case. Here, the intuition for a possible multiplicity is the same as
in his model. If agents expect (partial) taxation of their investments, (before-tax) repayment
obligations of the government are relatively large because these agents require a correspondingly
higher interest rate. But large repayment obligations create an ex post incentive to tax them away
once they are fixed (see Section 3). In contrast, if no taxation is expected, the bond interest rate
will be so low that any ex post incentive for taxation is absent. The equilibrium with zero debt
taxation Pareto dominates the one with partial taxation. The difference in welfare results from the
fact that in the latter case the tax on income and the implied distortionary losses z(.) are higher,
only because of the losses associated with the taxation of debt repayments.
Contrary to Calvo (1988), a zero marginal cost of debt taxation (α=0) doesnot necessarily
lead to complete debt taxation. Therefore, an equilibrium can exist even ifα=0, although its
existence becomes less likely (for given values of the other parameters).11 In Calvo’s model, all
agents hold the same amount of government debt. Hence, ifα=0, the agent’s income tax payments
are reduced one for one per unit of debt taxed away. A benevolent government minimises total
distortionary losses through complete taxation of any outstanding government debt. Because there
is no distributional conflict in his model, ex post every agent would be in favour of complete debt
taxation. Therefore, ifα=0, no equilibrium can exist in the standard Calvo model. If debt were
unequally distributed in his model, the richer agents might be opposed to debt taxation, because the
reduced value of their debt repayments is not compensated by the reduction in their income tax
payments. This would allow for the potential existence of an equilibrium even ifα=0, because the
tax rate on debt depends on the relative wealth of the agent represented by the government. As
with a fall in α, an increase in bA raises the left hand sides of (4.1) and (4.2), which renders the
existence of equilibria less likely. The reason is that for any given value of Rb,t-1>0 (hence, also for
potential equilibrium values) complete taxation of debt is more likely if gross debt service costs are
higher. Finally, an decrease in the population growth rate,η>1 raises the left hand sides of (4.1)
11 In fact, if α=0, either no equilibrium or a unique equilibrium with zero debt taxation exists.
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and (4.2), which reflects a decrease in the number of young in favour of low debt taxation. The
right hand sides of (4.1) and (4.2) also rise, which reflects the increased political power of the old.
In general, the combined effect of a fall inη on the number of equilibria is ambiguous, although
for η large enough, there always exist two equilibria. The reason is that, while the tax burden on
the young becomes negligible, their degree of altruism towards the old remains unaffected. Hence,
the minor increase in their own expected consumption from an increase in the tax rate on debt is
easily outweighed by the effect on their own utility of a fall in their parent’s consumption.
5. Conclusions
In this paper I have investigated the politico-economic effects of a slowdown in the birth rate and
hence an increase in the number of old and retired people in the voting population. In general, this
affects the taxation of the old in two opposite directions. On the one hand, the political power of
the old increases, which exerts a downward pressure on the taxation of their assets. On the other
hand, the tax burden on the young, needed to maintain the living standards of the old, increases.
This raises their support for a shift towards more taxation of the old.
A potentially interesting extension of the present paper would be to allow for capital
accumulation and capital taxation (which particularly hurts the old), in order to study the politico-
economic consequences of a fall in the population growth rate for long-run economic growth. The
intuition would be that the expected choice of the tax rate on capital affects the willingness to save
for retirement and thereby the growth rate of the economy.
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